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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 6, 2003, the International Court of Justice issued its
decision in Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v.
United States of America).' In this case, Iran claimed that the United States
had breached the "freedom of commerce" provision in the 1955 Treaty of
Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the two countries
by taking military action against Iranian offshore oil platforms in 1987 and
1988. The Court properly rejected this claim, finding that the U.S. actions
against the oil platforms did not disrupt commerce between the territories of
Iran and the United States.
Despite rejecting Iran's claim, the Court devoted a substantial portion of
its opinion to a consideration of whether the U.S. actions against the oil
platforms qualified as self-defense under international law. The Court's
statements concerning this issue were unnecessary to resolve the case and
thus, in our domestic legal system, would be considered non-binding dicta. In
addition, many of the statements were made in passing and in vague terms,
without significant reference to state practice, legal precedent, or scholarly
commentary, making it difficult to assess their implications.
The Court's statements nevertheless merit comment. The right of States
to defend themselves from armed attacks is essential to their national security.
Among other things, it allows States to deter armed attacks that would
otherwise occur and to discourage further armed attacks. The United States is
concerned that the Court's opinion might be read as suggesting limitations on
the right of self-defense that are unsupported by international law and practice
and that would undermine, rather than strengthen, international peace and
security.
This contribution focuses only on the self-defense issues addressed by
the Court and does not consider other issues relating to the international law
of self-defense, such as the legality of anticipatory or preemptive uses of
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force. Nor does the contribution address other aspects of the Court's opinion,
including its treatment of the burden of proof and its conclusion that the
security exception in the 1955 Treaty implicitly encompassed general
principles of self-defense.
II. BACKGROUND
As the Court explained in its opinion, the events underlying the Oil
Platforms case occurred during what became known as the "Tanker War,"
which was part of the 1980-1988 war between Iran and Iraq.2 During the
Tanker War, Iran and Iraq attacked numerous military and commercial vessels
of varying nationalities in the Persian Gulf, including vessels from neutral
countries such as Kuwait. The result, as the Court noted, was that "neutral
shipping in the Persian Gulf was caused considerable inconvenience and loss,
and grave damage." 3 These attacks were repeatedly condemned by the U.N.
Security Council, and were the subject of a series of complaints by the United
States and other neutral countries.4
In response to the attacks, Kuwait asked several nations, including the
United States, to re-flag Kuwaiti vessels in order to ensure their protection.
The United States subsequently placed eleven Kuwaiti vessels under U.S.
registry, and began in 1987 to provide naval escorts to all U.S.-flagged vessels
operating in the Gulf. A number of other neutral countries took similar action
to protect international shipping in the Gulf.
5
Despite these efforts, numerous neutral ships, including re-flagged
Kuwaiti vessels and U.S. naval escort vessels, were attacked during 1987 and
1988.6 Two specific attacks were of particular relevance to the Oil Platforms
case. On October 16, 1987, the Kuwaiti oil tanker, Sea Isle City, which had
been re-flagged to the United States, was hit by a missile while in Kuwaiti
waters. The missile attack injured six crew members and damaged the ship.7
Three days later, after concluding that Iran was responsible for the missile
attack,8 U.S. naval forces, in an effort to prevent further attacks, took action
against two Iranian offshore oil platform complexes that it had determined
2. See id. paras. 23-24.
3. Id. para. 44.
4. Thus, for example, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution in 1984 responding to a
letter from the representatives of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates "complaining against Iranian attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the ports of
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia." The Security Council stated that "these attacks constitute a threat to the
safety and stability of the area and have serious implications for international peace and security," and
demanded "that such attacks cease forthwith." S.C. Res. 552, U.N. SCOR, 39th Sess., 2546th mtg., U.N.
Doe. S/RES/552 (1984). The Security Council further condemned attacks on neutral shipping in the Gulf
in resolutions adopted in 1986 and 1987. See S.C. Res. 582, U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2666th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/582 (1986); S.C. Res. 598, U.N. SCOR, 42d Sess., 2750th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/598
(1987).
5. See Oil Platforms, para. 24.
6. See id.
7. See id. para. 52.
8. This conclusion was supported by extensive evidence, including satellite imagery showing
missile sites under Iranian control in the area where the missile originated, eyewitness accounts of
similar missile launchings from this area, and analysis of missile fragments from the earlier missile
launchings. See id. paras. 53, 58.
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were being used for offensive military purposes. Before taking action against
the platforms, the United States gave the personnel at the facilities notice and
time to evacuate. 9 That same day, the United States sent a letter to the U.N.
Security Council, pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, informing the
Council that the United States had acted in self-defense. The letter described
the U.S. actions against the oil platforms, the Iranian attacks that had led to
the actions (including the missile attack on the Sea Isle City), and the various
ways in which Iran had been using the oil platforms for offensive military
purposes.10
Subsequently, on April 14, 1988, the U.S. naval vessel USS Samuel B.
Roberts was struck by a mine in international waters near Bahrain while
returning from an escort mission.11 The mining of the ship injured ten U.S.
sailors and damaged the ship. 12 Several days later, after concluding that Iran
was responsible for the mine attack,13 U.S. naval forces, in an effort to prevent
further attacks, took action against two Iranian offshore oil platform
complexes. Once again, the United States gave the personnel at the facilities
advance notice and time to evacuate, and once again it submitted a letter to the
Security Council informing the Council of what had happened and explaining
that the United States had acted in self-defense.
1 4
In November 1992, Iran initiated the Oil Platforms case against the
United States. In its application to the Court, Iran claimed that the United
States had violated several provisions of a 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic
Relations and Consular Rights between the two countries, as well as general
international law, by taking military action against the oil platforms. In a
preliminary judgment entered in December 1996, the Court determined that it
had jurisdiction to hear the case, but only with respect to Iran's claim that the
United States had violated Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 treaty, which
states that, "Between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties there
shall be freedom of commerce and navigation."'
' 5
After receiving extensive written submissions, and hearing oral
arguments, the Court issued a final judgment in the case in November 2003.
As the Court noted, its task was "to determine whether or not there have been
9. See id. para. 67 (quoting U.S. statement that "[a]ll feasible measures have been taken to
minimize the risk of civilian damage or casualities...").
10. See id.; Letter Dated 19 October 1987from the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/19219 (1987).
11. See Oil Platforms, para. 69.
12. See id. para. 67.
13. The U.S. conclusion was again supported by a variety of types of evidence, including
Iran's general practice of using mines, the discovery of an Iranian vessel in the process of laying mines,
the existence of other mines in the same area bearing Iranian serial numbers, statements by Iranian
military leaders, and the conclusions of the international shipping community. See id. paras. 63, 69, 71.
14. See id. paras. 66-67; Letter Dated 18 April 1988 from the Acting Permanent
Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/19791 (1988).
15. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) (Preliminary Objections), 1996 I.C.J. 803 (Dec. 12). The
United States subsequently filed a counter-claim against Iran, arguing that Iran's military actions in the
Gulf had disrupted commerce in violation of Article X of the 1955 treaty.
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breaches of the 1955 Treaty. ' 6 In that regard, the Court held that the United
States had not violated Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 treaty by taking
actions against the Iranian oil platforms because, as the United States had
argued, these actions did not interfere with commerce between the two
countries. 17 Although this conclusion was sufficient to dispose of Iran's claim,
the Court nevertheless decided to express its views about another argument
that the United States had made in response to the claim. The United States
had argued that, even if the U.S. actions against the oil platforms had
interfered with freedom of commerce between the parties, the actions did not
violate the treaty because they were measures "necessary to protect its
national security interests," as allowed for by Article XX, paragraph 1(d), of
the treaty. In addressing this issue, the Court stated that this provision would
not allow for a use of force that was not permitted under general international
law.1
8
The Court then proceeded to consider whether the U.S. actions against
the Iranian oil platforms constituted self-defense under the United Nations
Charter and customary international law. It concluded that they did not. In
explaining its decision to address the self-defense issue despite the fact that it
was rejecting Iran's claim, the Court noted the "importance of the implications
of the case in the field of the use of force."'19 Five of the judges on the Court,




The U.N. Charter restricts the use of force by States to resolve
21international disputes. It also expressly recognizes, however, the "inherent
right" of States to use force in self-defense. 22 As the Charter's drafting history
makes clear, "The use of arms in legitimate self-defense remains admitted and
unimpaired. 2 3 Although the U.N. Security Council plays an important role in
addressing threats to international peace, it is often unable to deter or put an
end to the use of force. The right of States to act individually and collectively
in self-defense, therefore, remains a central pillar of international peace and
security.
24
The Court's statements in the Oil Platforms case concerning self-
defense, although unnecessary to resolve the case and part of a judgment that
is binding only with respect to the particular dispute and the particular parties,
might be read as suggesting a number of limitations on the right of self-
16. Oil Platforms, para. 21.
17. See id. paras. 98-99.
18. See id. paras. 39-42.
19. Id. para. 38.
20. See Oil Platforms (separate opinions of Judges Buergenthal, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren,
Kooijrnans, and Owada).
21. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
22. Id. art. 51.
23. Report of Rapporteur of Committee 1 to Commission I, (June 13), 6 DOCUMENTS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 446,459 (1945).
24. See generally D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 184-99 (1958).
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defense. In particular, there is language in the opinion that might be read to
suggest:
" that an attack involving the use of deadly force by a State's regular
armed forces on civilian or military targets is not an "armed attack"
triggering the right of self-defense unless the attack reaches some
unspecified level of gravity;
" that an attack must have been carried out with the intention of
harming a specific State before that State can respond in self-defense;
" that self-defense may be directed only against targets of the attacking
State that have been the subject of specific prior complaints by the
defending State; and
" that measures taken in self-defense must be proportional to the
particular attack immediately preceding the defensive measures rather
than proportional to the overall threat being addressed.
As explained below, international law and practice do not support these
limitations on the right of self-defense. Furthermore, such limitations would
undermine the ability of States to deter aggression and would therefore have
the unfortunate effect of encouraging, rather than discouraging, the use of
force. The United States presumes that the Court did not intend to suggest
these limitations.
A. Definition of "Armed Attack"
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter recognizes that each State has the
"inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs." 25 In explaining its resort to self-defense in this case, the United States
presented evidence of a series of attacks by Iran, including the launching of
the missile that hit the U.S.-flagged vessel, Sea Isle City, as well as, in the
Court's words, "the mining of the United States-flagged Bridgeton on 24 July
1987; the mining of the United States-owned Texaco Caribbean on 10 August
1987; and firing on United States navy helicopters by Iranian gunboats, and
from the Reshadat oil platform, on 8 October 1987." 6 After considering this
evidence, the Court concluded that, even "[o]n the hypothesis that all the
incidents complained of [by the United States] are attributable to Iran, 27 they
did not trigger a right of self-defense because they did not constitute an
"armed attack." In reaching this conclusion, the Court made statements that
might be read as suggesting that the attacks were required to reach some
unspecified level of gravity before they would qualify as armed attacks. The
Court also made statements that might be read as suggesting that, in order to
qualify as armed attacks against the United States, the Iranian attacks had to
be aimed specifically at U.S. vessels. Neither proposition is correct as a matter
25. U.N. CHARTER art. 51; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 244, para. 38 (July 8) ("In Article 51, the Charter recognizes the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.").
26. Oil Platforms, para. 63.
27. Id. para. 64.
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of international law, however, and the United States does not interpret the
opinion as relying on them.
1. Gravity of Attack
In concluding that the actions by Iran did not constitute an armed attack,
the Court stated that "it is necessary to distinguish 'the most grave forms of
the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave
forms.' ' 28 The Court also stated that "[e]ven taken cumulatively, and
reserving . . . the question of Iranian responsibility, these incidents do not
seem to the Court to constitute an armed attack on the United States. 29 The
Court similarly concluded that, although it would "not exclude the possibility
that the mining of a single military vessel might be sufficient to bring into
play the 'inherent right of self-defence,"' it was "unable to hold" that the mine
attack in this case constituted an armed attack.3°
The Court made these statements in passing and in the context of highly
factual discussions, so it is unclear what effect the Court intended them to
have. These statements might be read to suggest that uses of deadly force by a
State's regular armed forces, such as the attacks by Iran at issue in this case,
do not qualify as an armed attack unless they reach a certain level of gravity.
Such a proposition, however, would be inconsistent with well-settled
principles of international law. As noted above, the United Nations Charter
specifically recognizes a right to defend against an "armed attack," and it
contains no suggestion that only certain armed attacks qualify. Nor do
collective self-defense treaties referring to "armed attack" suggest any gravity
requirement. The gravity of an attack may affect the proper scope of the
defensive use of force (that is, its proportionality, an issue discussed below),
but it is not relevant to determining whether there is a right of self-defense in
the first instance.
32
A requirement that an attack reach a certain level of gravity before
triggering a right of self-defense would make the use of force more rather than
less likely, because it would encourage States to engage in a series of small-
28. Id. para. 51 (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, 101, para. 191 (June 27)).
29. Id. para. 64.
30. Id. para. 72.
31. See, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, arts. 5, 6, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S.
243, 246-47; Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 3, 62 Stat. 1681, 1700,
21 U.N.T.S. 77, 95.
32. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTE1N, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 176 (3d ed. 2001)
("There is certainly no cause to remove small-scale armed attacks from the spectrum of armed
attacks."); ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT
251 (1994) ("Is the question of level of violence by regular forces not really an issue of proportionality,
rather than a question of determining what is 'an armed attack'?"); Dieter Fleck, Rules of Engagement
for Maritime Forces and the Limitation of the Use of Force Under the UN Charter, 31 GERMAN Y.B.
INT'L L. 165, 177 (1988) ("Armed attacks cannot logically be divided into such attacks to which
response may lawfully be made in exercise of the inherent right of self-defence and other such attacks
where self-defence should not be permissible."); John Lawrence Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and
the Future of the Law of Force and Self-Defense, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 135, 139 (1987) ("[Tlhe plain
language of Article 51 . . . in no way limits itself to especially large, direct or important armed
attacks.").
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scale military attacks, in the hope that they could do so without being subject
to defensive responses. Moreover, if States were required to wait until attacks
reached a high level of gravity before responding with force, their eventual
response would likely be much greater, making it more difficult to prevent
disputes from escalating into full-scale military conflicts.
In discussing the gravity of attack issue, the Court relied on statements it
had made in its 1986 decision in the Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua.33 In that decision, the Court
distinguished "the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an
armed attack) from other less grave forms. 34 In applying that distinction, the
Court in Nicaragua observed that "armed attack" includes
not merely action by regular armed forces across an international border, but also "the
sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries,
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to"
(inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, "or its substantial
involvement therein".
35
The Court also stated that "armed attack" includes "the sending by a State of
armed bands to the territory of another State, if such an operation, because of
its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than
as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces. 36
By contrast, the Court concluded that the concept of armed attack does not
apply to "mere assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or
logistical or other support.
37
When read in context, these statements by the Court in the Nicaragua
case are focused on the distinction between direct uses of force by a State's
regular armed forces and indirect uses of force, such as the use of force
through the sending of armed bands or through the supply of weapons. 38 The
33. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.)
(Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). The United States has in the past expressed concern about the Court's
reasoning in the Nicaragua case, and the discussion here is not intended to imply any change of position
in that regard. The point is simply that, even on its own terms, that decision would not support a
"gravity" requirement in the context of the Oil Platforms case.
34. Id. 1986 I.C.J. at 101, para. 191.
35. Id. 1986 I.C.J. at 103, para. 195 (quoting the U.N. General Assembly's 1974 Definition of
Aggression). The General Assembly resolution quoted by the Court purported to define "act of
aggression," a concept relating to the Security Council's authority under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter,
not Article 51 's concept of "armed attack." Moreover, the provisions of the resolution that are addressed
to direct attacks by a nation's regular armed forces contain no gravity requirement. See, e.g., G.A. Res.
3314 (XXIX), Annex, art. 3(b), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, 143, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974) (stating that "[b]ombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State
or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State" qualifies as an act of
aggression); id. art. 3(d) (defining act of aggression to include "[a]n attack by the armed forces of a State
on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State").
36. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 103, para. 195.
37. Id. Although not relevant to the Oil Platforms case, the limitations on self-defense
suggested by the Court in Nicaragua are problematic in a number of respects. See, e.g., Hargrove, supra
note 32; Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and the Use of Force, 82 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 420
(1988); Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 259 (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel).
38. See also IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 278-79
(1963) (distinguishing between direct attacks by a State's regular armed forces and "[s]poradic
operations by armed bands"); HIGGINS, supra note 32, at 250-51 (noting that the discussion in
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gravity of an attack, these statements suggest, is relevant only in determining
whether non-conventional or indirect uses of force qualify as "an actual armed
attack conducted by regular forces." Other than with its reference to a
"frontier incident" (presumably an isolated instance in which border forces
may be acting without authority), the Court was not suggesting that a
particular level of gravity is required before a direct attack, involving the use
of deadly force by a State's regular armed forces, will qualify as an armed
attack. There is certainly nothing in the Court's discussion in Nicaragua
implying that missile and mine attacks on naval and commercial vessels are
anything less than an armed attack.
In sum, there is no support in international law or practice for the
suggestion that missile and mine attacks carried out by a State's regular armed
forces on civilian or military targets of another State do not trigger a right of
self-defense. For its part, if the United States is attacked with deadly force by
the military personnel of another State, it reserves its inherent right preserved
by the U.N. Charter to defend itself and its citizens.
2. Specific Intent of the Attacking State
In concluding that the United States had not been subjected to an armed
attack, the Court referred to a purported lack of evidence that Iran, in
launching the missile that hit the Sea Isle City and in mining international
waters, had specifically intended to hit U.S. targets. Importantly, the Court did
not suggest that the hostile actions by Iran were accidental, or that Iran could
not have expected its actions to harm the United States. Instead, the Court
simply noted that the missile that hit the Sea Isle City had been fired from
such a distance that it could not have been aimed at a specific vessel, but
rather was "simply programmed to hit some target in Kuwaiti waters., 39 As
for the mining of shipping lanes known to be used by U.S. vessels, the Court
noted that there was "no evidence that the minelaying . . . was aimed
specifically at the United States" or that the mine that struck the USS
Bridgeton "was laid with the specific intention of harming that ship, or other
United States vessels.
40
The Court's statements might be read to suggest that military attacks on
a State or its vessels do not trigger a right of self-defense as long as the attacks
are not aimed specifically at the particular State or its vessels but rather are
carried out indiscriminately. Such a proposition, however, is not supported by
international law, and it would undermine, rather than maintain, international
peace and security. States have a right of self-defense so that they can protect
their national security and deter attacks against them, concerns that are
implicated just as much when States are subjected to indiscriminate attacks as
when they are subjected to targeted attacks.
Nicaragua was focused on the distinction between direct armed attacks and indirect armed attacks and
suggesting that the level of force used by regular armed forces is relevant to the issue of proportionality,
not to whether there has been an armed attack).
39. Oil Platforms, para. 64.
40. Id.
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A requirement of specific intent would also encourage intentionally
indiscriminate attacks, since no victim would have the right to defend against
them. International law, however, does not give such favorable treatment to
indiscriminate attacks. Indeed, a number of international agreements expressly
prohibit indiscriminate attacks even in situations in which the use of force in
question would otherwise be lawful. For example, Article 51(4) of the First
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions expressly prohibits
indiscriminate attacks.41 In the specific context of minelaying, Article 3 of the
1907 Hague Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine
Contact Mines provides that, "When anchored automatic contact mines are
employed, every possible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful
shipping. ' 42 In addition, Article 3(8) of the Amended Protocol II to the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and Article 3(3) of the initial
Protocol II to the Convention contain prohibitions on indiscriminate attacks
using mines that are covered by those protocols.43 The International Court of
Justice has itself emphasized the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks in prior
decisions as an important principle of international humanitarian law. In
light of the disfavored treatment of indiscriminate attacks in international law,
to suggest that such attacks have special immunity from the right of self-
defense cannot be correct.
The United States accepts-as it believes all responsible States do-the
need under international law to observe the principle of distinction in the use
of force. If another State violates this principle and attacks the United States
by unlawfully using indiscriminate force, the United States, like any State, is
legally entitled to defend itself and its citizens.
B. Necessity and Proportionality
To constitute legitimate self-defense under customary international law,
it is generally understood that the defending State's actions must be both
"necessary" and "proportional." 45  The Court's articulation of these
requirements in the Oil Platforms decision, however, might be read to suggest
41. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, art. 51(4), 1125
U.N.T.S. 3,26.
42. Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines (Hague No.
VIII), Oct. 18, 1907, art. 3, 36 Stat. 2332.
43. See Protocol [II] on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and
Other Devices to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons, Appendix C, Oct. 10, 1980, art. 3(3), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.95/15 (1980) (entered into force
with respect to the United States Sept. 24, 1995), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1529; id. as amended May 3,
1996, art. 3(8), 35 I.L.M. 1206, 1210 (1996).
44. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) (Merits), 1949 1.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9); Military and
Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 112, para. 215; see also SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 117, para. 42(b) (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995)
(noting that States are "forbidden to employ methods of warfare which... are indiscriminate, in that...
they are not, or cannot be, directed against a specific military objective").
45. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 245, para. 41;
Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 94, para. 176; OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 152-55 (1991).
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limitations that are neither consistent with state practice nor supported by the
relevant authorities.
1. Necessity and Prior Complaints
The Court stated that it was "not satisfied that the attacks on the
platforms were necessary to respond to" the Iranian attacks.a6 It noted, in this
connection, that "there is no evidence that the United States complained to
Iran of the military activities of the platforms... which does not suggest that
the targeting of the platforms was seen as a necessary act. "47 Although the
import of this language is unclear, it might be read to suggest that self-defense
may be directed only against targets that have been the subject of specific
prior complaints by the defending State. There is, however, no basis for such a
requirement in either international law or practice.
The condition of "necessity," rather, requires that no reasonable
alternative means of redress are available. a In the Oil Platforms case, the
United States presented evidence that it had been subjected to a series of
ongoing attacks, and that it had repeatedly complained to both Iran and the
Security Council about these attacks.4 9 The Court noted that the United States
had "complained repeatedly of minelaying and attacks on neutral shipping." 50
Moreover, the Court did not dispute that the United States was unable to
dissuade Iran from conducting such attacks by means not involving the use of
force. It follows that resort to force was necessary in order to protect the
United States from such attacks.
An additional requirement whereby a defending State would have to
specifically complain about particular targets would be impractical and would
substantially undermine the right of self-defense. When responding in self-
defense to an armed attack, there will often be insufficient time in which to
make complaints about potential targets. More significantly, it would be
unrealistic to require a nation that is engaged in self-defense to signal precise
targeting information to the attacker and thereby allow the attacker either to
remove its military resources in order to undermine the effectiveness of the
defensive use of force or, worse, to reinforce the target. In this case, the
United States did give Iran brief notice before taking actions against the oil
platforms, so that personnel could be evacuated and the loss of life minimized.
While it may be appropriate in particular situations to provide some notice as
part of an effort to reduce casualties, there is no requirement in international
law that a State lodge complaints about the use of particular facilities by an
attacker in order to meet the necessity requirements that apply where an
attacker cannot reasonably be persuaded, by means short of the use of force,
to cease its armed attacks.
46. Oil Platforms, para. 76.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 32, at 184; Oscar Schachter, The Right of States To Use
Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1635 (1984).
49. See Oil Platforms, paras. 63, 76, 120. Because the United States and Iran did not have
diplomatic relations at the time, U.S. complaints to Iran were transmitted through Switzerland.
50. Id. para. 76.
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The United States consistently takes all reasonable steps to respond to
and deter armed attacks without resort to the use of force. Where response by
force is needed, however, there is, except in rare instances, 51 no legal
requirement that the State that initiated an armed attack be informed of the
particular target that will be the object of the responsive use of force.
2. Proportionality
The Court also concluded that the U.S. actions against the oil platforms
after the mine attack on the USS Samuel B. Roberts were not proportional.52
The Court's opinion might be read to suggest that the use of force by the
United States was problematic simply because it was greater in degree than
the mine attack on the USS Samuel B. Roberts. The Court referred, for
example, to "the mining, by an unidentified agency, of a single United States
warship, which was severely damaged but not sunk, and without loss of
life.
,53
There is no requirement in international law that a State exercising its
right of self-defense must use the same degree or type of force used by the
attacking State in its most recent attack. Rather, the proportionality of the
measures taken in self-defense is to be judged according to the nature of the
threat being addressed. As Judge Roberto Ago explained, "What matters [with
respect to proportionality] is the result to be achieved by the 'defensive'
action, and not the forms, substance and strength of the action itself... Its
lawfulness cannot be measured except by its capacity for achieving the
desired result." 54 In this case, the defensive objective was to defeat and deter
armed attacks by Iran and thereby protect U.S. ships against the ongoing
threats posed by Iranian actions in the Gulf.
A proper assessment of the proportionality of a defensive use of force
would require looking not only at the immediately preceding armed attack, but
also at whether it was part of an ongoing series of attacks, what steps were
already taken to deter future attacks, and what force could reasonably be
judged to be needed to successfully deter future attacks. 55 The United States
51. In certain rare cases, international law specifies that notice must be given to a specific
enemy target prior to an attack that is otherwise justified. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 19, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3530, 75 U.N.T.S
287, 300 (civilian hospitals). These rare examples only confirm the lack of a notice requirement for
other facilities being used for offensive military purposes, such as, in this case, oil platforms.
52. See Oil Platforms, para. 77.
53. Id.
54. Roberto Ago, Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, Il-I Y.B. INT'L L.
COMMISSION 13, 69 (1980), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7; see also SCHACHTER, supra note 45, at
153 ("Acts done in self-defense must not exceed in manner or aim the necessity provoking them.")
(emphasis added); SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 44, at 76 (principles of necessity and proportionality
"do not require that a State which is attacked use only the degree and kind of force that has been used
against it but that the force employed by the State acting in self-defence be proportionate to what is
required for the achievement of legitimate objectives of self-defence," which include "repelling the
attack, recovering territory which had been lost as a result of the armed attack and restoring its security
against repetition of the armed attack").
55. See, e.g., SCHACHTER, supra note 45, at 154 ("[The use of force may be justified] when [a]
State has good reason to expect a series of attacks from the same source and such retaliation serves a
deterrent or protective action."); Ago, supra note 54, at 69-70 ("If, for example, a State suffers a series
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will continue to follow this approach in assessing what measures to take when
responding to an armed attack.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Oil Platforms, the Court's opinion addressed at substantial length
issues concerning the law of self-defense, even though it was not necessary to
resolve these issues in order to decide the case. This excursion is regrettable as
a matter of form. Even more regrettable, however, is the fact that there are
statements in the Court's opinion that might be read to suggest new and
unsupported limitations on the ability of States to defend themselves from
armed attacks. Such limitations would substantially and dangerously enlarge
the ability of States to undertake armed attacks without fear that these attacks
will be defended against.
It is well established in international law and practice that: attacks by a
State's regular armed forces involving the use of deadly force need not rise to
a certain level of gravity before they trigger the right of self-defense; the right
of self-defense applies to indiscriminate as well as targeted attacks; a State
taking action in self-defense need not first complain about the targets against
which it is taking action; and the proportionality of an act of self-defense is to
be measured in light of the overall threat being addressed. In these
circumstances, the United States cannot assume that the Court intended
general statements that were unnecessary to the Court's decision to be read to
contradict these long settled principles. The United States, for its part, will
continue to follow what it understands to be a correct interpretation of
international law on these points.
of successive and different acts of armed attack from another State, the requirement of proportionality
will certainly not mean that the victim State is not free to undertake a single armed action on a much
larger scale in order to put an end to this escalating succession of attacks.").
